Jonas Harney

jonas.harney(at)uni-saarland.de
Bldg. A2 3, Room 0.12,
Tel. +49 (0) 681 302-3688

For further information, visit my personal website: jonasharney.com

I'm currently finishing my PhD at Saarland University, where I’m also a (predoc) research and teaching fellow. In October 2024, I’m probably going to start a postdoc at TU Dortmund. Before that, I did my M.A. in Philosophy at Humboldt University Berlin (2018) and my B.A. in Philosophy, Sociology, and Political Sciences at TU Dresden (2012). I was a research and teaching fellow at Humboldt University Berlin (2019–2020) and a research visitor at Rutgers University (Fall 2021).

My research is mainly on moral theory, with a specialisation on the ethics of well-being, interpersonal aggregation, and distributive justice. In my dissertation "The Dual Force of Welfare", I’ve investigated the distinction between personal and impersonal views in welfare ethics, including investigations on the grounds of the moral value of welfare, population ethics, and welfare trade-offs between individuals. Finishing upon these issues, I plan to work more on (partial) aggregation, particularly in multiple-option choices. I’m also interested in political philosophy, decision theory, and applied ethics. I’m a co-organiser of the Workshop on Welfare and Ethics (WoW) and I was Vice President of the German Society for Utilitarian Studies (2020–2023). I’ve taught various courses on normative ethics, ethical theories, political philosophy, (distributive) justice, well-being, applied ethics, and further topics at Humboldt University Berlin and Saarland University.

 

PhD Project: "The Dual Force of Welfare. Unravelling Personal and Impersonal Views in Ethics"

Welfare matters morally! But how? Is the morality of welfare impersonal, focused on the good in the world and how to promote it? Or is the morality of welfare personal, concerned with particular people and how they fare? In my PhD project, I’ve dealt with the distinction between personalviews and impersonalviews on the morality of welfare in three parts.

What precisely is the distinction between personal and impersonal views on the morality of welfare? Part I identifies and distinguishes the particular senses of both these notions. I develop a novel taxonomy of personal and impersonal views including (i) the agent-dependency of morality, (ii) the ground of the moral value of welfare, (iii) moral aggregation, (iv) interpersonal welfare trade-offs, (v) the morally relevant types of personal values.

Which view is plausible? Part II takes up the task of deciding between the personal and impersonal sides of the previously carved-out distinctions, respectively. I argue for the Dual Personal View of Welfare: Welfare has moral value if and only if, and if, then because, it has personal absolute or personal comparative value for the individual whose welfare it is. I also advocate a formal version of moral aggregation and argue that welfare trade-offs between individuals are either always or at least sometimes permissible.

How do we morally compare outcomes? In Part III, I explore a dual theory of outcomes comparisons based on the previous results: absolute welfare and comparative welfare make outcomes morally better and worse. I investigate various ways in which the dual theory can unfold. One core of that discussion is a novel interpretation of the Comparative View (better known as a narrow person-affecting view): welfare gains and losses set-wise considerations: they make outcomes morally better and worse relative to all outcomes in a fixed set of compared outcomes.

Education

  • since 05/2018: PhD Student, Saarland University, Department of Philosophy, Chair for Practical Philosophy, supervised by Christoph Fehige 
  • 09–12/2021: Research Visit in Philosophy at Rutgers University, sponsored by Prof. Larry Temkin, funded by German Academic Exchange Service
  • 03/2018: M.A. in Philosophy, Humboldt-University Berlin, Thesis: Reasons of  Beneficence and the Non-Identity Problem. A Challenge to Johann Frick’s Bearer-Dependent Solution
  • 11/2012: B.A. in Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science, TU Dresden, Thesis: Gendiagnostik im Namen des genetischen Weltbildes. Kritischethische Reflexion der Grundlagen und der medizinischen Anwendung der Gentechnologie
  • 06/2008: Abitur, Carl-Friedrich-Gauß Gymnasium, Schwedt/Oder

Employment

  • 09/2020—present: Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter (Graduate Assistent), Department of Philosophy, Professorship for Practical Philosophy (Prof. Christoph Fehige and Prof. Ulla Wessels), Saarland University
  • 10/2019—08/2020: Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter (Graduate Assistent), Department of Philosophy, Chair for Practical Philosophy and Didactics (Prof. Kirsten Meyer), Humboldt-University Berlin
  • 04/2018–10/2019: Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter (Graduate Assistant), Department of Philosophy, Saarland University
  • 01/2016–03/2018: Studentische Hilfskraft (Student Research Assistant), Humboldt-University Berlin, Department of Philosophy, Chair for Practical Philosophy and Didactics (Prof. Kirsten Meyer)

Publications

  • forthcoming. 'Utilitarismus und Populationsethik' (Utilitarianism and Population Ethics). In Bernward Gesang and Vuko Andrić (eds.), Handbuch Utilitarismus. Stuttgard: Metzler.

  • forthcoming. 'Summen- und Durchschnittsutilitarismus' (Total and Average Utilitarianism). In Bernward Gesang and Vuko Andrić (eds.), Handbuch Utilitarismus. Stuttgard: Metzler.

  • 2023. 'The Interpersonal Comparative View of Welfare: Its Merits and Flaws'. The Journal of Ethics 27 (3), pp. 369–391. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-023-09436-7

  • 2023. 'How to Assess Claims in Multiple-Option Choice Sets‘. Philosophy & Public Affairs 51 (1), pp. 60–92. (Together with Jake Khawaja.) https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12227

  • 2021. 'On Parfit’s Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle‘. In Michael Schefczyk and Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Utility, Progress, and Technology: Proceedings of the 15th Conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies, Karlsruhe: KIT Scientific Publishing, pp. 69–78. https://www.ksp.kit.edu/site/books/e/10.5445/KSP/1000134479/

  • 2020. ‘Comparative Personal Views and the Non-Identity Problem’. Intergenerational Justice Review 5 (2), pp. 62–63. https://doi.org/10.24357/igjr.5.2.770

  • 2016. ‘Wie lässt sich solidarische Ökonomie weltweit verwirklichen? Ein Portrait von FairBindung’ (How to realize solidarity economy worldwide? A portrait of FairBindung). Bastian Ronge (ed.). Solidarische Ökonomie als Lebensform. Berliner Akteure des alternativen Wirtschaftens im Porträt (Solidarity economy as life form. Berlin-based players of alternative economy portrayed). Bielefeld: transcript, pp. 71–95.

  • 2011 ‘Personalisierte Unmündigkeit. Zur Rationalität der Nutrigenomik und ihren Funktionen’ (Personalized immaturity. The rationality of nutrigenomics and its functions).Gen-ethischer Informationsdienst, Spezial Nr. 11, pp. 24–32.

Talks and Paper Presentations (selection)

  • 27/06/2024 Welfare Losses in Variable Population Choices with Multiple Options, WoW 2024 – Workshop on Welfare and Ethics, Saarland University
  • 20/06/2024 Taking Narrow Person-Affecing Considerations Seriously, 17th ISUS Conference, University College London
  • 30/05/2024 Taking Narrow Person-Affecing Considerations Seriously, Value Theory Workshop, Lund University
  • 12/07/2023 The Ground of the Moral Value of Welfare: Personal or Impersonal?, Workshop on Welfare 2023, Saarland University
  • 10/02/2023 How to Assess Claims in Multiple-Option Choice Sets (together with Jake Khawaja), Slippery Slope Normativity Summit, Lillehammer
  • 18/11/2022 Narrow Person-Affecting Considerations for Future People, Moral Theory & Future Generations, LMU Munich
  • 13/09/2022 Two Views on Claims in Multiple-Option Choice Sets (together with Jake Khawaja), 11th Congress of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP.11), Humboldt University Berlin
  • 26/03/2022 The Combining View of Claims (together with Jake Khawaja), North Carolina Philosophical Society Joint Meeting with the South Carolina Society for Philosophy, Converse University
  • 15/10/2021 Some Problems of the Interpersonal Comparative View, Center for Values and Social Policy, University of Colorado Boulder
  • 24–28/08/2020 The Moral Mode of Prioritarianism: Absolute or Hybrid?, 10th European Conference of Analytic Philosophy (ECAP10), Utrecht University
  • 13/02/2020 The Moral Mode of Prioritarianism: Absolute or Comparative? Karlsruhe-Saarbrücken Colloquium (KASCO), Karlsruhe Institute for Technology
  • 20/11/2019 How Impersonal is Welfare Aggregation? Research Colloquium (Prof. Christian Seidel), Karlsruhe Institute for Technology
  • 27/09/2019 The Impersonal Claims of Future People VII. Conference in Practical Philosophy (Tagung für Praktische Philosophie), University of Salzburg
  • 19/09/2019 Distinguishing Personal and Impersonal Elements of Welfare Aggregation, SOPhiA Conference, University of Salzburg
  • 29/04/2019 Distinguishing Personal and Impersonal Views in Welfare Ethics, Normative and Applied Ethics Colloquium (Prof. Kirsten Meyer), Humboldt- Universität zu Berlin
  • 18/11/2018 Personal Value in Variable Population Comparison, Workshop on Practical Philosophy, Saarland University
  • 20/09/2018 The Bearer-Dependent View of Beneficence and the Non-Identity Problem, 10th Congress of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP.10), University of Cologne
  • 24/07/2018 Parfit’s Dual Person-Affecting Principle: A Double Hybrid , 15th Conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies (ISUS), Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
  • 06/05/2018 Personal and Impersonal Betterness of Outcomes: A Hybrid View, Workshop on Practical Philosophy, Saarland University
  • 21/01/2018 Why the Bearer-Dependent View fails to solve the Non-Identity Problem. A reply to Johann Frick, Workshop on Practical Philosophy, Saarland University
  • 26/10/2017 The Bearer-Dependent View of Beneficence and the Non-Identity Problem, Normative Ethics and Metaethics Colloquium (Prof. Thomas Schmidt), Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
  • 27/09/2017 Person-Affecting Repugnant Conclusion, XXIV.Congress of German Society for Philosophy (DGPhil), Humboldt- Universität zu Berlin

Teaching (selection)

  • M.A. Seminar Recent Works in Practical Philosophy, together with Christoph Fehige, Saarland University, Summer Term 2024
  • B.A. Seminar Risikoethik (ethics of risk), Saarland University, Summer Term 2024
  • M.A. Seminar Actions and Norms, together with Christoph Fehige, Saarland University, Summer Term 2023
  • B.A. Seminar Folter vs. Lutscher: Trade-offs zwischen Personen (torture vs. lollipops: trade-offs between people), Saarland University, Winter Term 2023/2024
  • M.A. Seminar Topics in Analytic Ethics, together with Christoph Fehige, Saarland University, Summer Term 2023
  • B.A. Seminar Populationsethik (population ethics), Saarland University, Summer Term 2023
  • B.A. Seminar Klimaethik (climate ethics), Saarland University, Winter Term 2022/2023
  • B.A. Seminar Verteilungsgerechtigkeit (distributive justice), Saarland University, Summer Term 2022
  • B.A. Seminar Vertragstheorien in der politischen Philosophie und Ethik (contract theories in political philosophy and ethics), Saarland University, Winter Term 2021/2022
  • B.A. Seminar Larry Temkin: Rethinking the Good, Saarland University, Summer Term 2021
  • B.A. Seminar Tugendethik in Antike und Gegenwart (ancient and contemporary virtue ethics), Saarland University, Winter Term 2020/2021
  • Advanced Seminar Theorien des Wohlergehens / Theories of Welfare, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Summer Term 2020
  • Proseminar Klassischer Utiltiarismus / Classical Utilitarianism, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Summer Term 2020
  • Advanced Seminar Populationsethik / Population Ethics, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Winter Term 2019/2020
  • Proseminar Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Winter Term 2019/2020
  • B.A. Seminar Werkzeuge deontologischer Moraltheorien (Tools of Deontological Ethics), Saarland University, Summer Term 2019
  • B.A. Seminar Sollte man die größere Anzahl retten?, Saarland University, Winter Term 2018/2019
  • B.A. Seminar Ethik in den Religionen, Saarland University, Winter Term 2018/2019

Workshop and Conference Organization

  • WoW 2024: Workshop on Welfare and Ethics, co-organized with Thorsten Helfer, Saarand University, 27-28/06/2024
  • Workshop on Welfare 2023, co-organized with Thorsten Helfer, Saarland University, 12-13/07/2023
  • Workshop on Welfare 2022, co-organized with Thorsten Helfer, Saarland University, 23-24/06/2022
  • Workshop on Welfare 2021, co-organized with Thorsten Helfer, Saarland University, 09-11/07/2021
  • Karlsruhe-Saarbrücken Colloquium of Philosophy, co-organized with Thorsten Helfer, Saarland University, 12/02/2019

Voluntary Engagement and Memberships

  • 01/2020–12/2023 Vice President of the Gesellschaft für Utilitarismusstudien e.V. (German Society for Utilitarian Studies)
  • Member of the Scientists for Future (S4F) Saarland
  • Member of the Gesellschaft für Utilitarismusstudien e.V. (German Society for Utilitarian Studies)
  • Member of the Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophy e.V. (German Society for Analytic Philosophy)
  • Reviewer for Utilitas, Philosophical Quarterly, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Moral Philosophy and Politics
 

Der Header ist ein Ausschnitt von Hermann Waibels Bild "Lichtfarbe" von 1987. Wir danken Herrn Waibel für die freundliche Erlaubnis, sein Bild zu nutzen.